

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 MOSCOW 01568 031928Z

60

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 EA-07 NEA-10 ISO-00 SAJ-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 /077 W
----- 030820

R 031450Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9441

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMCONSUL HONG KONG

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USLO PEKING

AMEMBASSY RANGOON

AMEMBASSY SEOUL

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TAIPEI

AMEMBASSY TOKYO

AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE

CINCPAC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 1568

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR, JA, VN, CB, KN, XB, RP, XC, BM

SUBJECT: SOVIET RELATIONS WITH ASIA: KAPITSA'S VIEWS

1. SUMMARY. IN ADDITION TO HIS COMMENTS ON CHINA (SEPTTEL),

MIKHAIL KAPITSA, CHIEF OF THE SOVIET MFA'S FIRST FAR EAST

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 MOSCOW 01568 031928Z

DEPARTMENT, GAVE HIS VIEWS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN SEVERAL OTHER

ASIAN COUNTRIES DURING MY CALL ON FEB 2. HE SAW PEKING SEEKING TO PROMOTE SUBVERSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, EXPECTED VISITS TO MOSCOW BY MARCOS AND KIM IL SUNG IN THE COMING FEW MONTHS AND SAID THAT JAPANESE ACCEPTANCE OF THE "HEGEMONY" LANGUAGE WOULD FORCE MOSCOW TO "RECONSIDER" ITS OWN TREATY TALKS WITH TOKYO. HE DESCRIBED ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY AS A "SMALL FIRE" TO WHICH MOSCOW OCCASIONALLY ADDS A LOG, BUT IT STILL NEEDS TIME TO BECOME SPECIFIC. END SUMMARY.

2. ON SOUTHEAST ASIA KAPITSA SAID THAT CHINA DOES NOT WANT TO "CHALLENGE THE U.S." AND THEREFORE SEEKS BETTER STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENTS IN THE AREA. AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, PEKING IS STILL AIDING SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENTS PARTICULARLY IN BURMA AND THAILAND. WHEN NE WIN WENT TO PEKING RECENTLY, HE THOUGHT HE HAD RECEIVED A GUARANTEE AGAINST CHINESE SUPPORT FOR BURMESE INSURGENTS. BUT A FEW WEEKS LATER, SEVERAL MAJOR CLASHES BETWEEN THE BURMESE REGULAR FORCES AND THE INSURGENTS SHOWED THAT THIS WAS NOT SO AND THE BURMESE WERE AGAIN "DISAPPOINTED."

3. ON CAMBODIA, KAPITSA SAID THAT THE CHINESE "ARE LOSING OUT." THE NATIONALIST ELEMENT IS BECOMING MORE ASSERTIVE. KAPITSA COMPARED CAMBODIAN ATTITUDES TO THE VIETNAMESE TO VIETNAMESE VIEWS OF THE CHINESE. THERE IS HISTORICAL ANTIPATHY, HE SAID, AND HANOI WILL NOT BE ABLE TO DOMINATE PHNOM PENH. THE EMBASSIES WHICH ARE NOW FUNCTIONING IN CAMBODIA ARE HIGHLY RESTRICTED. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, THE SOVIET UNION IS "NOT IN A HURRY" TO SET UP A MISSION THERE, HE SAID.

4. TURNING TO THE PHILIPPINES, KAPITSA SAID THAT HE EXPECTED PRESIDENT MARCOS TO VISIT MOSCOW "IN THE SUMMER". HE SAID THAT DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD PROBABLY BE ESTABLISHED AT THAT TIME. KAPITSA SAID THAT AFTER MARCOS HAD INDICATED PUBLICLY THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS NEED NOT AWAIT HIS VISIT, MOSCOW HAD INSTRUCTED ITS AMBASSADOR TO THE UN TO WORK OUT A STATEMENT. BUT THEN MARCOS HAD BACKED OFF AGAIN. NOW IT LOOKED AS THOUGH THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONS WOULD HAVE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 MOSCOW 01568 031928Z

AWAIT HIS VISIT. "THEY SEEM TO BE AFRAID OF US," SAID KAPITSA, EVEN THOUGH THE EXAMPLES OF SOVIET EMBASSIES IN MALAYSIA AND OTHER ASEAN STATE SHOULD BE AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT A SOVIET MISSION WOULD NOT BE A CAUSE FOR WORRY.

5. ON NORTH KOREA, KAPITSA MENTIONED THE RECENT BILATERAL TRADE AND AID AGREEMENT, EMPHASIZING THAT IT WAS "STRICTLY ECONOMIC" AND THAT IT CONTAINED "NOTHING

NEW." HE SAID IT PROVIDED A CREDIT FOR A STEEL MILL, A POWER STATION AND A FERTILIZER PLANT. IN ADDITION IT PROVIDED FOR EXPANSION OF AN EXISTING FERTILIZER PLANT AND FOR INCREASED DELIVERIES "TO 1.5 MILLION TONS PER YEAR" OF SOVIET COKING COAL. THE SOVIETS WOULD ALSO POSTPONE REPAYMENT OF NORTH KOREAN DEBTS FOR FIVE YEARS. NORTH KOREA SEEMS TO HAVE A CHRONIC PROBLEM MEETING ITS TRADE ACCOUNTS, SAID KAPITSA; "THEY RUN A DEFICIT OF 20 TO 40 MILLION RUBLES A YEAR." ON A POSSIBLE VISIT TO MOSCOW BY KIM IL SUNG, KAPITSA SAID HE THOUGHT ONE WAS LIKELY IN APRIL OR MAY, BUT THAT NO DATE HAD YET BEEN SET. KIM HAD WANTED TO COME LAST MAY, SAID KAPITSA, BUT BREZHNEV WAS ILL. (COMMENT. KAPITSA WAS AT PAINS TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE NEW ACCORD WAS STRICTLY ECONOMIC, IMPLYING THAT THERE WAS NO MILITARY COMPONENT AND THEREFORE NO REASON FOR THE U.S. TO BE CONCERNED. END COMMENT.)

6. TURNING TO JAPAN AND GROMYKO'S RECENT VISIT, KAPITSA SAID THAT THE CHINESE WERE SEEKING TO IMPOSE THEIR WORDING ON "HEGEMONY" AND "YOU ARE ENCOURAGING THE JAPANESE TO ACCEPT IT." I DENIED THAT WE HAD TAKEN ANY SUCH STAND. KAPITSA DID NOT ARGUE BUT SAID THAT THE SOVIETS TOLD THE JAPANESE THAT IF THEY ACCEPT SUCH WORDING, MOSCOW "WILL RECONSIDER" ITS POSITION ON NEGOTIATING A PEACE TREATY WITH JAPAN. THESE TALKS HAD ONLY BEGUN AFTER THE BREZHNEV-TANAKA MEETING IN 1973 AND THEY COULD BE SUSPENDED AGAIN, HE SAID. THE SOVIET UNION, SAID KAPITSA, "MIGHT" RETURN TO THE 1956 FORMULA ON THE NORTHERN TERRITORIES, BUT THIS WOULD BE "A MAXIMUM" POSITION. JAPAN IN ANY CASE INSISTS ON ALL FOUR ISLANDS AND THIS IS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIET UNION. JAPAN HAD USED THE KURILES TO CUT OFF CONTACT BETWEEN THE U.S. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 MOSCOW 01568 031928Z

AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE PACIFIC DURING WORLD WAR II AND HAD SUNK "ABOUT 200" SOVIET SHIPS, SAID KAPITSA. TO OUR QUESTION ON WHETHER GROMYKO HAD ACTUALLY OFFERED TO RETURN TO THE 1956 FORMULA, KAPITSA SAID THAT HE HAD NOT. GROMYKO'S FORMULATION, HE SAID, WAS TO ENCOURAGE JAPAN TO STICK TO A "REALISTIC COURSE," WHICH BOTH SIDES UNDERSTOOD TO MEAN A COMPROMISE ON THE TERRITORIAL ISSUE.

7. I ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET COMMENTARY ON ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY (ACS), IN PARTICULAR THE PRAVDA LEAD ARTICLE OF JAN 27. KAPITSA SAID THAT THE 25TH PARTY CONGRESS WOULD SAY SOMETHING ABOUT ACS BUT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT "PUSH" THE IDEA. THE TIME IS NOT YET RIPE, SAID KAPITSA, BUT THE IDEA IS RELEVANT. THE SPECIFIC FORM IS NOT IMPORTANT, HE SAID, BUT ASIA

NEEDS TO EVOLVE FROM CONFLICT, INTERVENTION AND TENSION
TOWARDS STABLE AND PEACEFUL RELATIONS. SUCH A
SCHEME WOULD OF COURSE HAVE TO INCLUDE CHINA BECAUSE
DECISIONS AFFECTING ASIA AS A WHOLE CANNOT BE TAKEN
WITHOUT CHINA'S PARTICIPATION. SOONER OR LATER THE
CHINESE WILL SEE THAT THEIR INTERESTS LIE IN SUCH AN
ARRANGEMENT DESPITE PEKING'S CRITICAL COMMENTS NOW.
PEKING WAS PREVIOUSLY VERY CRITICAL OF ASEAN BUT NOW
THEY SPEAK FAVORABLY OF IT. MOSCOW IS NOT YET CALLING
FOR A CONFERENCE; MORE TIME IS REQUIRED. "WE SEE IT AS
A SMALL FIRE, AND WE OCCASIONALLY THROW ON ANOTHER LOG
AND MAYBE SOME DAY WE WILL BE ABLE TO WARM OUR HANDS OVER IT."
ALTHOUGH THE EXAMPLE OF HELSINKI AND THE GRADUAL RESOLUTION OF
INTERSTATE PROBLEMS IN EUROPE IS A BENEFICIAL EXAMPLE, HE SAID,
IT IS CLEAR THAT THE EUROPEAN FORMULA, PARTICULARLY ON TERRITORIAL
PROBLEMS, IS NOT APPLICABLE TO ASIA. BUT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR
ASIA TO EVOLVE A SYSTEM WHICH ALLOWS FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE
AND THE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES WITHOUT RESORT TO ARMED CONFLICT.
STOESSEL

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PERSONAL OPINION, FOREIGN RELATIONS, COLLECTIVE SECURITY, AGREEMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 FEB 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: coburnhl
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976MOSCOW01568
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D760041-0453
From: MOSCOW
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760288/aaaaczgf.tel
Line Count: 188
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: coburnhl
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 15 APR 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <15 APR 2004 by CollinP0>; APPROVED <11 AUG 2004 by coburnhl>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOVIET RELATIONS WITH ASIA: KAPITSA'S VIEWS
TAGS: PFOR, CH, UR, JA, VN, CB, KN, XB, RP, XC, BM, (KAPITSA, MIKHAIL)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006